culture in the 1960s and has now spread to virtually every area of EU policy making, where day-to-day regulatory and spending decisions are taken by mixed committees of Commission and member-state representatives. The significance of these committees for EU governance and for social theory, however, remains a matter of dispute, with two distinct theoretical images of comitology being put forward in the literature. The first of these approaches, drawn from sociological institutionalism and constructivism, suggests that EU committees provide a forum in which national and supranational experts meet and deliberate in a search for the best or most efficient solutions to common policy problems. In this view, comitology is not an arena for hardball intergovernmental bargaining but rather for a technocratic version of deliberative democracy in which informal norms, deliberation, good arguments, and consensus matter more than formal voting rules, which are rarely invoked. A second view, derived from rational choice theory, depicts comitology committees as control mechanisms designed by member-state principals to supervise their supranational agent (the Commission) in its executive duties. In this approach, member government preferences are assumed to be fixed, the aim of comitology is control rather than deliberation, and the rules governing a committee matter in determining the discretion of the Commission in a given issue area.
This article examines the design and the workings of EU comitology committees, looking for evidence that comitology operates either as a control mechanism in which the primary aim is control and decision-rules matter or as a forum for deliberation in which the national/supranational line breaks down and formal rules do not matter in determining outcomes. The article is divided into four parts. The first part introduces comitology and provides a bare-bones history of its development. The second examines the two "images" of comitology in rationalist and sociological institutionalist analyses, respectively, and makes a preliminary attempt to generate distinctive middle-range hypotheses from each of the two approaches. The third section analyzes both quantitative and qualitative data regarding the institutional choice of comitology procedures, the results of which suggest that the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and EU member governments all possess systematic preferences over comitology procedures, which are designed deliberately by the latter to provide a measure of member-state control over the Commission. The fourth and final section concludes with a brief restatement of findings and an agenda for further research.
Council. Later still, the Council developed a third and less restrictive type of committee, the "advisory committee," which the Commission was obliged to consult but without any requirement to follow the committee's advice.
1 By 1968, the EP's Legal Affairs Committee had identified the now-familiar classification of advisory, management, and regulatory committees, and in 1970 the European Court of Justice, in its Köster ruling, affirmed the legality of Council delegation to the Commission and of the comitology system in general.
During the two decades between the early 1960s and the 1986 signature of the Single European Act, the number and type of comitology committees increased drastically as the Council of Ministers chose to delegate evergreater implementing powers to the Commission, accompanied in each case by a specific committee of member-state representatives, but without any overarching rules or structure. The adoption of the Single European Act of 1986, and its accompanying plan for the completion of the internal market by the end of 1992, however, forced the issue of the Commission's implementing powers to the fore. Faced with a self-imposed deadline for the completion of the internal market, member governments agreed that the Council would henceforth be required to delegate additional implementing powers to the Commission and that these powers should be regulated by a more systematic set of comitology procedures. Accordingly, the member governments agreed to add a new paragraph to Article 202 EC that called on the Council to "confer upon the Commission, in the acts which the Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays down." The same article, however, also specified that these powers would be subject to some sort of comitology; that the Council could "in specific cases" retain implementing powers to itself; and that the Council would agree unanimously (and after consulting the EP) on a new and systematic framework for comitology committees. In addition, the member governments appended to the Treaty a declaration (No. 1) to the effect that the Council, "in the interests of speed and efficiency in the decision-making process," would give "a predominant place" to the Advisory Committee procedure for internal market legislation to expedite the adoption of the 1992 program.
The Council decision of July 13, 1987 provided for the first time for overarching rules concerning the types of comitology committees and the rules governing their operations. In its original proposal, the Commission had proposed a relatively simple scheme in which advisory committees would constitute the most common committee type, with a secondary role for manage-128 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / February-March 2003 1. For more on the historical development of the comitology system, see, for example, Vos (1997 , p. 212), Bertram (1967 -1968 ), and Haibach (2000 . ment committees. The EP, in its opinion, proposed several major changes to the Commission's draft decision, including the elimination of the most binding regulatory committee procedure and new provisions that would increase the role of the EP by requiring the Commission to forward draft-implementing measures to the EP as well as to the relevant committee.
The Council, however, rejected the EP's amendments in favor of a structure that was more complex and more restrictive than the Commission's original proposal in three ways. First, the Council's final decision retained the Commission's three basic committee types-advisory, management, and regulatory-but introduced variants into both the management and regulatory committee procedures, including the controversial "safety net" procedure (IIIb) that would allow the Council to overturn a Commission decision by simple majority without putting an alternative policy in its place. Second, the Council decision introduced two variants of a "safeguard procedure," that is used in specific cases in which the Commission has been allocated powers to adopt temporary safeguard measures (primarily in international trade) and whereby a single member state can call for a Commission decision to be examined by the Council. Third, the final decision included a provision allowing the Council to retain implementing responsibilities for itself in certain circumstances; such a possibility had been implied by the new Article 145 EC but left out of the Commission's draft proposal. The resulting committee procedures, and the rules specific to each, are summarized in Table 1 .
Between 1987 and 1999, the Comitology Decision structured legislative choices about the delegation of powers to the Commission and the committee structures established to "assist and support" the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers. Nevertheless, the 1987 comitology system was not without its detractors, both political and academic, who charged that the system represented a step backward from previous practice in that it formally introduced a new procedure (IIIb) that could result in a Council veto and paralysis in the implementation of EC law. Other critics pointed out that comitology committees generally operated behind closed doors and comitology fared poorly in terms of the normative criteria of transparency, openness, and democratic accountability. In addition, the 1987 decision provided no guidance on the selection of committee type for a given piece of legislation, which was decided in practice by legislative bargaining among the Commission, the member governments in the Council, and, insofar as it participated in the legislative process, the EP.
Perhaps the most vehement and persistent critic of comitology, in fact, has been the EP, which has engaged in a long interinstitutional debate with the Council about the design and choice of comitology committees. The EP's Pollack / TWO IMAGES OF COMITOLOGY  129 objections, as Hix (2000, p. 70) In special cases, the Council reserves the right to exercise "Procedure V" direct implementing powers itself.
Source: Adapted from Hix (1999, p. 43 ). a. In Procedures I-IIIb, the Commission must consult the relevant committee of national experts on the proposed implementation measures; Procedure IV features a Commission proposal directly to the Council, whereas in Procedure V, the Council retains sole responsibility for implementation.
Commission answerable not to the EP, which is excluded, but to a committee of member-state representatives, thus weakening democratic control of the implementation process. The EP has therefore consistently advocated the adoption of the less-constraining advisory committee procedure and argued for the abolition of the regulatory procedure. Second, and more fundamentally, "the EP should have equal rights with the Council to review, approve, and veto proposed implementation measures in those areas where it shares legislative authority with the Council" (Hix, 2000, p. 70) . The EP has therefore consistently condemned the 1987 decision, which was adopted under Article 145 as a Council decision and which provided the EP with no institutional role in the comitology process. Furthermore, despite being excluded from the actual adoption of the decision, the EP has pursued a more or less consistent campaign against comitology, using the legal, budgetary, and political resources at its disposal (Bradley, 1997, p. 230) . On the legal front, the EP attempted in 1988 to challenge the legality of the decision before the Court of Justice, only to be denied standing by the Court. On the budgetary front, the EP has frequently used its power to discharge the EU budget to force the Commission to produce information about the number and workings of comitology committees-a strategy that has enjoyed some limited success in terms of transparency but has not produced any change in the fundamental structure of the system (Bradley, 1997, pp. 240-243) .
The EP's displeasure with comitology was amplified further after the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, which made the EP a colegislator with the Council in many issue areas but retained the Council's monopoly on the implementation process through comitology. In 1993, the interinstitutional dispute came to a head when the EP used its new powers under the codecision procedure to veto a draft directive on the liberalization of telecommunications, primarily because of its dissatisfaction with the comitology provisions. Soon after, the Commission, the Council, and the EP signed a new interinstitutional agreement, the so-called "modus vivendi," which went some way towards satisfying the EP's demands. Under this 1994 agreement, the Commission agreed to send draft implementing measures to the EP and inform the EP when a comitology committee had given an adverse opinion, and the Commission and Council agreed to take account "as far as possible" of the EP's opinions in such cases. In addition, the Council also agreed that the question of comitology would be referred to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, and the Commission accordingly proposed a revision of Article 202. The member governments, however, resisted adopting any Treaty amendments on comitology and instead annexed Declaration 31 to the Amsterdam Treaty, calling on the Commission to submit a new draft decision by the end of 1999.
2 Accordingly, the Commission proposed in July 1998 a new draft decision, which would retain the overall structure of the comitology system but make four basic changes to it. The thrust of these four reforms was retained by the Council in its June 1999 decision but with significant amendments.
3 First, by contrast with the case-by-case selection of committee types under the 1987 decision, the 1999 decision included new criteria to guide the choice of implementing procedures, under which the management procedure was to be used for the implementation of the common agricultural and fisheries policies, and more generally for programs with substantial budgetary implications; the regulatory committee procedure was used for measures "designed to apply essential provisions of basic instruments," particularly in the areas of health and safety; and the advisory committee procedure "shall be used in any case in which it is considered to be the most appropriate." Although this provision was intended to provide guidance in the choice of procedures and minimize the intergovernmental and interinstitutional horse-trading that had previously taken place in comitology choices, the Council nevertheless amended the Commission's proposal to note that "such criteria are of a nonbinding nature," leaving the Council with a continuing margin of discretion in the choice of procedures.
Second, the Commission proposed to simplify the procedures by removing the variants from the management, regulatory, and safeguard procedures, and in particular the contre-filet, or "safety-net," variants to which the Commission had long objected. Here again, the Council agreed to the overall thrust of the Commission's proposals while making substantive as well as stylistic changes to the Commission's draft. With regard to the management committee procedure, the new decision effectively removes variant IIb, under which the Commission was required to defer application of the measure pending a Council decision, in favor of a single procedure whereby the Commission may defer application for up to 3 months; otherwise, the voting rules in both the committee and the Council remain unchanged from the old management committee procedure.
With regard to the regulatory committee procedure, the Commission presented a simplified single procedure whereby, if the committee failed to support the Commission's proposed measures, the Commission would withdraw the measure and submit a legislative proposal under the relevant treaty arti-
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3. For the text of the Council decision, see Official Journal L 184/23-26, 1999, analyzed in detail by Lenaerts and Verhoeven (2000) .
cle. In negotiations, however, member governments objected to the Commission's proposal, which essentially would force the committee to choose between the Commission's proposal on one hand and an extended legislative process involving long delays and, in some cases, codecision with the EP on the other. During the negotiations, therefore, the German presidency proposed a compromise procedure in which a failure to agree in the committee would result in a reference to the Council of Ministers, which would have 3 months to either (a) endorse the measures by qualified majority voting (QMV), after which the measures would be adopted; (b) fail to act, in which case the Commission would adopt the measures; or (c) oppose the measures by QMV, in which case the Commission would reexamine the measures and resubmit them to the committee, with or without amendments, or as a legislative proposal. In this sense, the German presidency draft was similar to the safety net of the old variant IIIb, except that the Council would need a qualified rather a simple majority vote to block a Commission decision. Precisely for this reason, Denmark, Portugal, and Spain initially refused to approve the compromise, insisting that the Council should be able to block Commission decisions by simple majority in the areas of the environment, social policy, and health. The deadlock was finally broken when the Commission agreed to issue a declaration undertaking in "particularly sensitive sectors" not to go against "any predominant position which might emerge within the Council against the appropriateness of an implementing measure." 4 As a third element in its draft decision, the Commission proposed various mechanisms to inform the EP of the activities of comitology committees, including the transmission of the Commission's draft decisions, meeting agendas, and other information to the EP. In essence, the new decision institutionalized many of the provisions of the 1994 modus vivendi, but it fell short of meeting the EP's more radical demands such as those for the elimination of the regulatory committee procedure and for a formal right to "call back" Commission proposals of which it disapproves.
Fourth, the new decision contained a number of measures to increase the transparency of the comitology process for the general public, including a requirement for the Commission to publish for the first time a complete list of all comitology committees, to be followed by an annual report on the workings of committees.
In short, the 1999 Council decision retained the basic structure of the existing comitology system, although simplifying its procedures and making the system somewhat more transparent to the EP and the public. Neverthe-
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less, the choice of comitology procedures has remained a contentious issue in the adoption of new legislation since the 1999 decision, and the problems of accountability and transparency have not been resolved to the satisfaction of the system's critics.
TWO IMAGES OF COMITOLOGY
Despite its complexity and obscurity, comitology has attracted increasing attention in recent years from social scientists of all stripes, who have been quick to identify these committees as a distinctive and increasingly important feature of governance in the EU.
5 However, although the various approaches to comitology agree on its general importance in EU governance, they differ starkly in their interpretation of it, with rational choice theorists modeling comitology as a control mechanism used by member states to finely calibrate the extent of Commission autonomy, and sociological institutionalist and constructivist theorists arguing that, far from being a oversight mechanism for control-minded member governments, comitology committees can work in practice as a forum for depoliticized, deliberative decision making in which Commission and member-state representatives work side by side in search of optimal solutions to the challenges of European governance.
THE RATIONALIST IMAGE: COMITOLOGY AS OVERSIGHT
The rational-choice approach to comitology fits within a broader literature that applies theoretical approaches derived from the study of American politics to the study of the European Union and its international organizations. Specifically, this author and others have drawn on principal-agent models of delegation by legislative principals (i.e., Congressional representatives in the U.S. case or national governments in the case of international relations) to executive or judicial agents (i.e., regulatory agencies or courts in the U.S. case or supranational organizations in international relations). Such delegation, it is argued, offers potentially significant advantages to principals by providing policy-relevant information and allowing principals to commit credibly to their agreements. Yet delegation also creates the potential for losses, if and insofar as the agents thus empowered possess policy prefer-
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ences distinct from those of the principals, and use their delegated powers to pursue those preferences. Faced with the threat of such supranational activism, member-state principals adopt both administrative procedures and oversight mechanisms to limit supranational discretion (Pollack, 2002) .
In the context of such an approach, rational choice scholars have in recent years developed both formal and informal models of comitology committees as control mechanisms that allow member-government principals to monitor and sanction the behavior of their agent, the Commission. In a series of articles, Schmidtchen (1996, 1997) have modeled the power of the Commission to influence outcomes across the various procedures established by the 1987 Comitology Decision, demonstrating formally that the Commission enjoys at least some discretion in all variants of comitology, as in each case it can choose its own ideal-point from among the set of decisions that will not be reported from the committee to the Council and amended or vetoed in the Council. However, the authors also demonstrate that, across a range of assumptions about the preferences of the actors, the Commission enjoys the greatest influence under the advisory committee procedure (in which it is entirely unconstrained), followed by both versions of the management committee (where its decisions can only be overturned by qualified majorities in the committee and the Council), followed in turn by the regulatory (a) procedure (in which a blocking minority in the committee can secure a reference to the Council, which can take a different decision by QMV), and finally the regulatory (b) procedure (in which the Council need not take a decision by qualified majority but may simply opt to reject the Commission decision and retain the status quo by a simple majority). For this reason, the authors suggest, the Commission should have the following preference ordering: advisory committee > management committee > regulatory committee (a) > regulatory committee (b) This is a testable hypothesis, to which we shall return below. A second strand of the rational choice literature has focused on the role of the EP in the comitology process and on the institutional preferences of the EP over different types of comitology committees. Steunenberg et al. (1996 Steunenberg et al. ( , 1997 have modeled various alternative comitology procedures, assessing ways in which the EP might be integrated into existing comitology procedures and the resulting effects of Commission autonomy, while Franchino (2000a Franchino ( , 2000b has incorporated the EP into formal models of institutional choice, deriving the EP's preferences over comitology procedures. All else equal, these authors suggest, the EP should prefer a formal role in the Pollack / TWO IMAGES OF COMITOLOGY  135 comitology process, rather than being left out of comitology as in the 1987 decision. Franchino also suggested that, to the extent that the EP and the Commission share similar preferences vis-à-vis the Council, the former should be in favor of nonrestrictive comitology that leaves the Commission relatively unfettered by the preferences of the member governments. Finally, with regard to the Council and its constituent governments, rational-choice approaches predict that EU member governments will prefer and select comitology committees designed to maximize their expected utility by producing favorable "policy streams" in a given issue area. Their collective comitology choices, in turn, are predicted to be a function of the demand for policy-relevant expertise, credible commitments, and speedy and efficient decision making and of the institutional rules (e.g., voting rules in the Council, participation of the EP) governing the adoption of the delegating legislation (Franchino, 2000a (Franchino, , 2000b Pollack, 2002) .
SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONALISM, CONSTRUCTIVISM, AND DELIBERATION
An alternative image of comitology, derived largely from sociological institutionalism, has been put forward by Neyer (1997a, 1997b) , for whom comitology is not primarily an instrument of member-state control but a forum for a "deliberative supranationalism," a style of decision making that they put forward both as a normative ideal by which to judge EU governance and as an empirically accurate description of the workings of comitology in the field of foodstuffs regulation. Comitology has indeed been intentionally designed by member states, Joerges and Neyer argued, and its committees do indeed guarantee that constitutionally designated and nationally legitimate member governments take a seat at the collective supranational table where EC (European Community) regulations are adopted and implemented.
From this starting point, however, Joerges and Neyer (1997b) , in common with other constructivist and sociological institutionalist analysts, argued that the actual working of comitology committees departs substantially from the predictions of rational-choice models and of the actors who created them. Indeed, they suggest that rationalist approaches "lack the conceptual space" for theorizing about the aspect of comitology that they consider to be central, namely, "the interest of actors involved in finding common solutions to common problems by means of deliberative interaction" (Joerges and Neyer, 1997b, pp. 618) . Specifically, Joerges and Neyer distinguished between two distinct modes of interaction in forums such as comitology, namely, "strate-gic bargaining to maximize particular utilities at the expense of others and deliberative problem solving to maximize collective utilities" (1997b, pp. 618, emphasis added). Although rational-choice approaches focus only on the first, strategic mode of interaction, Joerges and Neyer (1997b) suggested that "the relative intensity of both modes may vary" and that deliberative problem solving is most likely under certain conditions, including, uncertainty about the distributive effects of certain policies, long-term interaction among delegates, as well as their mutual socialization into a community with common problem definitions and collectively shared approaches to dealing with them. Under such conditions, governments may be unaware of what their preferences are, or delegates, perceiving themselves as part of a transnational problem-solving community, may be able to change their governments' perceptions of interests or even simply bypass them. (p. 616) These conditions, Neyer (1997a, 1997b ) acknowledged, are not always met, and governments often have clear perceptions of their own preferences and the distributional consequences of the policies being decided. However, in their study of foodstuffs regulation, they find that the importance of scientific discourse limits the ability of delegates to discuss distributional issues, particularly in scientific advisory committees, which in turn focuses debate and deliberation onto scientific questions. In addition, the authors pointed out, delegates not only meet regularly in comitology committees but often have also met as part of advisory committees and working groups involved in the adoption of the legislation in question-an ideal setting for long-term socialization into common European norms. In this way, the authors argued, comitology committees pass from being institutions for the strategic control of the Commission by governmental representatives to being forums for deliberative interaction among experts for whom issues of control and distribution, as well as the carefully contrived institutional rules of their respective committees, recede into the background in favor of a collective search for the technically best solution to a given policy problem. Neyer (1997a, 1997b ) present a sophisticated and internally consistent picture of comitology based on extensive empirical research including observation of comitology meetings, interviews, and a survey of Commission and member-state representatives in such committees. Some of their findings, moreover, dovetail with other studies of comitology, which also chronicle the extensive participation of individual delegates in multiple committees, the Commission's efforts to achieve broad consensus among delegates, and the rarity of voting and-even more so-sanctioning Commission behavior.
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Nevertheless, we should be wary of jettisoning the rational-choice account of comitology as a control mechanism too quickly for three reasons. First, some of the evidence presented in Joerges and Neyer's own study (1997a, p. 280; 1997b, p. 617) suggests that the Commission does indeed play a forceful and consistent role as a corporate actor, bringing issues to a vote where consensus is out of reach and eliciting complaints from many member-state delegations. Indeed, the tabular results of the authors' survey research (1997a, p. 280) reveal that 7 of 11 member-state delegations characterize the Commission as acting in its "own interests" in the Standing Committee on Foodstuffs, whereas only 3 delegations characterize the Commission as a neutral mediator. Questions about the importance of formal rules reveal similarly mixed evidence, with 7 delegations responding "low," although 4 other delegations (including 4 of the 6 largest member states), consider procedural rules to have "high," "fairly high," or "medium" importance. Finally, the miscellaneous-remarks column of their findings shows that 3 delegations consider the Commission "too assertive" or "too dominant," whereas another suggests that "only IIIb [the most stringent form of regulatory committee] is acceptable," and another argues for "no delegation of further competences to the Commission." Taken as a whole, these findings suggest a comitology system in which deliberation may well take place but also one in which the Commission retains a distinct institutional role, and member governments remain acutely aware of the problem of control.
Second, even if we accept the authors' deliberative supranationalist reading of comitology in the foodstuffs sector, one might argue that this issue area is a most likely case for deliberative interaction, given the heavy emphasis on science and risk assessment in the foodstuffs sector and the extensive use made not only of implementing committees but also of scientific advisory committees. In other issue areas, such as the implementation of the EU's structural funds, national delegates may have clear preferences over outcomes, feel free to discuss distributive questions, have little need to discuss scientific questions of risk assessment, and therefore focus more extensively on issues of control than Joerges and Neyer's foodstuffs regulators.
Third and perhaps most importantly, we should beware of reading too much into the generally consensual nature of committee decision making and the infrequency with which committees vote at all, much less to overturn a Commission decision. In the U.S. context, students of congressional oversight committees have noted the same characteristic feature of the oversight process, in which federal regulatory agencies routinely anticipate the possibility of sanctions and adjust their behavior in advance to avoid sanctions through a "logic of anticipated reactions." In the case of the EU, this effect is magnified further by the structure of comitology committees, which are invariably chaired by a Commission representative, who might be expected to call a vote only when she expected the Commission position to be endorsed by the committee; in this sense, the surprising statistic is not the low number of negative votes but the fact that the committee takes any negative votes at all.
Under these circumstances, how can we study comitology empirically in such a way that would allow us to distinguish and test among these two competing images? This question, and my imperfect answer to it, is the subject of the next section.
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE OF COMITOLOGY: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In response to the problems of rational anticipation discussed above, students of regulatory agencies have pursued two distinct research strategies to test hypotheses about delegation and agency. The first and best established is the use of case studies and process tracing, which would allow us to understand the respective preferences of actors such as the Commission and of the member governments, and examine the process of committee decision making in practice. Among rational-choice analysts, Schmidt (1997) and Pollack (2002) have engaged in such case-study analysis, in areas such as the liberalization of telecommunications and electricity, merger control, the management of the Structural Funds, and the negotiation of the Uruguay Round. Their findings, although tentative, suggest that member governments do indeed use comitology committees as instruments of control and that Commission autonomy and influence vary as a function of the administrative and oversight procedures adopted by the Council. By contrast, Neyer's (1997a, 1997b) empirical research in the foodstuffs sector, although not reported in the form of a case study, de-emphasizes the control functions of comitology in favor of the emergence of deliberative interaction among delegates.
These contradictory results suggest, at the very least, the importance of case selection in the study of comitology. In their rationalist studies, Schmidt (1997) and Pollack (2002) select a range of cases across their hypothesized independent variable of committee structures, yet they make no effort to test across the conditions for deliberative interactions predicted by Neyer (1997a, 1997b) . By contrast, the latter deliberately focus on foodstuffs regulation as a most likely case for the emergence of deliberative supranationalism, but it remains open to question how far their findings might be generalizable beyond that sector. A definitive test of hypotheses regarding the existence of, and conditions for, deliberative supranationalism would therefore require two important steps. First, we would need to find rigorous and potentially reproducible measures of deliberation, as opposed to bargaining; Joerges and Neyer's interview data is compelling in this regard but is also subject to multiple interpretations, as we have seen. Second, and equally important, we would need to select a range of cases that vary along Joerges and Neyer's hypothesized independent variables, including uncertainty about the distributive effects of policies, length of service among committee members, and mutual socialization into a community with common problem definitions and working procedures. One might, for example, select for a range of cases including both scientifically complex (e.g., food safety) and overtly distributional (e.g., Structural Funds) issue areas as well as new or shifting as opposed to long-standing and stable committees. Such a detailed, multisectoral study is, unfortunately, far beyond the scope of this article.
Faced with such methodological obstacles, scholars are increasingly turning away from direct studies of agency behavior, focusing instead on the study of delegation as a dependent variable that can be expected to vary with variables such as uncertainty, political conflict, and other aspects of the political environment (Huber & Shipan, 2000, p. 41) . More specifically, scholars like Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) , Kathleen Bawn (1995 , and John Huber (1998) have turned to the literature on the transaction costs of policy making to generate specific predictions about the conditions under which legislative principals will delegate powers and discretion to their agents.
Applying such an approach to the rationalist/constructivist debate outlined above, we can derive two distinct and testable sets of hypotheses about the preferences of EU member governments and supranational organizations with regard to the choice of comitology committees. If we look first at the sociological institutionalist view exemplified by Neyer (1997a, 1997b) , we would expect that, insofar as deliberation characterizes the workings of comitology committees, formal voting rules should not be significant determinants of policy outcomes, and hence EU member governments and institutions are unlikely to engage in the sort of detailed, issue-specific calculations of expected utility predicted by rationalists in the choice of comitology committees. Rather, and in keeping with the general assumptions of sociological institutionalism, we should expect to see EU member governments and supranational actors behaving according to a "logic of appropriateness," eschewing detailed calculations of utility in each and every regulation or directive in favor of consensual norms or institutional templates that define the "legitimate" institutional form (e.g., the type of comitology committee) appropriate to a given issue area.
By contrast, rational-choice approaches suggest that the choice of comitology procedures matters in shaping policy outcomes and that the Commission, EP, and member governments should have systematic preferences over the choice of committee type and be willing to accept both search costs and costs of negotiation to secure their preferred institutional outcome. Specifically, rational choice analysts predict that the Commission should systematically prefer the "lighter" advisory procedure to the management procedure and the latter to the most stringent regulatory procedure. The EP, by contrast, should have a strong preference to be formally included in the comitology procedure; the EP should also prefer less constraining regulatory procedures for the Commission, if and insofar as its preferences are systematically closer to the Commission's than to the pivotal voter in the Council. The Council, finally, should generally prefer more restrictive comitology than the Commission or the EP, but preferences within the Council should vary across member governments and issue areas, as governments attempt to tailor comitology types so as to maximize their expected utility from the delegation decision. As a corollary, we would not expect to see actors falling back on agreed-on norms of what constitutes legitimate institutions in a given issue area but rather balance carefully the variable advantages of discretion and control decision by decision, both across and within issue areas.
To test these hypotheses about institutional preferences and the choice of comitology committees, I draw here on three bodies of evidence: (a) quantitative data regarding the revealed preferences over comitology of the Commission, EP, and the Council, respectively; (b) qualitative evidence regarding the preferences of the Commission, EP, and member states drawn from primary sources; and (c) case studies of intergovernmental and interinstitutional negotiations over the choice of comitology.
QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE OF COMITOLOGY CHOICES
In recent studies, both Rhys Dogan (2000) and Fabio Franchino (2000a) have collected extensive data about the comitology decisions taken by the Council (sometimes in cooperation or codecision with the EP) across a broad range of issue areas. Dogan's work examines the "revealed preferences" over comitology of the Commission, the EP, and the Council of Ministers, using a data set of 4,601 pieces of secondary legislation adopted between July 1987 and July 1995, 908 of which (19.7%) include some sort of comitology committee. Specifically, Dogan measured the comitology preferences of the various actors by examining (a) the types of comitology committee proposed by the Commission in its initial legislative proposals, (b) the committee type proposed by the EP in its amendments, and (c) the final decision, which is taken as a measure of Council preferences. Clearly, such measures capture not the sincere preferences of the actors but rather their negotiating positions Pollack / TWO IMAGES OF COMITOLOGY 141 in an interinstitutional bargaining process. 6 Nevertheless, Dogan's data are valuable for comparing the comitology choices advocated by each of the three actors, which are summarized for 371 pieces of legislation, including new comitology procedures in Table 2 .
Comparing the institutional positions of the three actors across the various comitology types, as well as the absence of committees in column 7 (see Table 2 ), shows that the Commission and the EP have systematically proposed delegating the Commission greater discretion than the Council, in its final legislation, has been willing to accept. Thus, for example, the Commission has proposed advisory committees in 48% of the proposals in Dogan's (2000) data set, and the EP has proposed an even higher 52.7%; in its final legislation, however, the Council has frequently tightened the Commission's proposed procedures, opting for advisory committees in only 23.2% of the cases. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Commission has proposed IIIb, the stricter version of the regulatory procedure, only 1.1% of the time, and the EP not at all; yet the Council has opted for this type in 18.1% of all legislation. Overall, Dogan's data on the relative preferences seems to support rational-choice predictions: the Commission generally prefers less constraining comitology measures, with the strong support of the EP, although the Council systematically prefers greater levels of control through more restrictive comitology.
REVEALED PREFERENCES OVER COMITOLOGY: QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE
Although Dogan's (2000) quantitative analysis lends preliminary support to rationalist views, it also leaves open questions about the motivations and perceptions of actors within the Commission, Council, and EP. In this section, therefore, I draw on primary source documents and interviews with key actors from each body, to determine the institutional preferences of all three actors in the comitology triangle, and assess the extent to which they match and perhaps explain the behavior of each actor in Dogan's data set.
Commission. In the case of the Commission, such a review of the qualitative evidence supports the view, derived both from rational-choice theory and 142 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / February-March 2003 6. The use of the final decision is, in fact, an imperfect proxy for the Council's preferences because the legislation adopted may have been influenced by the agenda-setting powers of the Commission-where the Council votes by qualified majority-or the legislative powers of Parliament, especially under the cooperation and codecision procedures. Given that both the Commission and Parliament show a revealed preference for "lighter" comitology, Dogan's (1997) measures probably understate the Council's collective preference for more restrictive committee procedures. from the quantitative record of its legislative proposals, that the Commission consistently prefers less rather than more constraining comitology procedures. In the years immediately following the adoption of the 1987 Comitology Decision, the Commission frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the operation of the system, and most notably with the Council's relatively light use of the advisory committee procedure and its extensive use of the IIIb, or safety-net, procedure. In its first report on the working of the decision, for example, the Commission considered that "the situation here is far from satisfactory." Much of the Commission's ire focused on the use of the IIIb procedure, which it noted "represents a considerable restriction on the Commission's freedom of action and, consequently, on the scope of delegation," by allowing a simple majority of member governments to block a Commission decision (Commission of the European Communities, 1989, p. 4). In addition, the Commission acidly pointed out that the member governments had manifestly ignored their own commitment, in the declaration attached to the SEA, to give precedence to the advisory committee procedure for internal market legislation. Rather, the member governments had demonstrated a willingness to delegate functions in certain "sensitive issue areas"-such as the research, banking, veterinary, food, and plant health sectors, and the environment-only if they could retain the safety net of the IIIb procedure, while in other areas, the Council refused to delegate to the Commission at all, preferring to retain implementing powers for itself (Commission of the European Communities, 1989, pp. 5-8).
In its day-to-day agenda-setting function, one participant pointed out, the Delors Commission made it a matter of "dogma" to propose the advisory committee procedure wherever possible, although in areas in which the Council had repeatedly adopted the management or regulatory (IIIa) procedures the Commission might anticipate this choice and propose those procedures as well; however, the Commission drew the line at proposing the IIIb procedure, to which it was opposed in principle. 7 This position led to frequent conflicts between the Commission and the Council, most notably when the Commission's refusal to accept a IIIb procedure endangered what would otherwise be a qualified majority in the Council. Faced with such a situation, the Commission would occasionally agree to accept more constraining comitology, including the IIIb procedure, in the second reading of legislation "where the decision was important and a qualified majority was the only possibility" (Commission of the European Communities, 1989, p. 7). In other words, when the Commission's preference for less restrictive comitology conflicts with its aim of securing the adoption of new legislation by qualified majority, the Commission has demonstrated a willingness to compromise on the former to secure the latter. Notwithstanding this pragmatism in individual cases, both the private and public statements of Commission officials, as well as the Santer Commission's proposals for the 1996 intergovernmental conference and the 1999 Comitology Decision reviewed above, reveal a consistent preference across several decades for less restrictive comitology maximizing the Commission's executive discretion.
European Parliament. The preferences of the EP regarding comitology have already been reviewed extensively above. As was noted, the EP has been active and vocal on the issue of comitology over several decades, with dozens of committee reports and plenary resolutions on the general system of comitology, the adoption of the 1987 and 1999 decisions, and the committee types proposed in specific pieces of legislation. Throughout these documents, the EP's institutional position has remained remarkably stable, preferring a clear distinction between legislation and implementation, a stronger role for the EP in comitology, and insistence on less restrictive forms of comitology that respect the Commission's right of implementation. In recent years, these principles have been expressed most clearly in the EP's report on the 1999 Comitology Decision, which includes detailed opinions from 15 Parliamentary committees, and provides both an overall picture of the EP position as well as the specific grievances and demands of committees dealing with specific issue areas. Regarding the current system and the Commission's proposed 1998 reforms, the report notes, "The EP's main criticisms are:
• Only Council (or member state) appointed committees have the right to scrutinize the Commission and refer back its decisions or draft decisions; the EP has no such right; • A matter referred back in such a way from the executive to the legislative authority is sent to Council alone, rather than to both branches of the legislative authority (EP and Council); • The whole system lacks transparency, with several committees of civil servants, the composition of which is not always published and the agendas of which are obscure. (EP, 1999, p. 13) transparency, with automatic transmission of information from all comitology committees to the EP (EP, 1999, p. 14) . In practice, the EP has operationalized these preferences through various guidelines for its members. For example, the 1990 Roumeliotis Report instructs MEPs systematically to delete regulatory committee procedures in favor of management or, in the case of internal market provisions, advisory committees (as cited in Hix, 2000, p. 71) .
8 Needless to say, the views expressed in these reports and guidelines are closely in line with both the predictions of rational-choice theory and the EP's behavior in the legislative process as captured by Dogan's statistical analysis. Nevertheless, in the words of longtime Environment Committee Chairman Ken Collins, the EP, like the Commission, "is not usually willing to sacrifice adoption of legislation or to go to conciliation 'for the sake of comitology, ' " (EP, 1999, p. 81) . For these reasons, and despite the strength of Commission and EP views on comitology, the preferences of the member governments in the Council are crucial to the choice of comitology procedures in secondary legislation.
The Council and the member governments. By comparison with the Commission and the EP, studying the preferences of the Council is considerably more challenging insofar as the Council is composed of 15 member governments with distinct views on comitology generally as well as on the specific type of comitology committee to be adopted in any given piece of legislation. Clearly, we have seen that the Council collectively has a preference for more restrictive comitology than either the Commission or the EP. Such a preference for greater collective control can be seen in the Council's extensive amendments to the Commission's drafts of both the 1987 and 1999 decisions and in the Council's systematic tightening of the Commission's and EP's proposed committee types.
Such a collective preference for greater control, however, masks a more diverse set of preferences both across member governments and across issue areas. The public record of member-state preferences on comitology is generally unrevealing, but interviews with Commission and member-state actors, as well as a careful examination of individual case studies, support the view that member governments do not take consistent positions on comitology choices across the board, nor do comitology preferences track ideological views about European integration with, for example, "supranationalist" member states supporting light comitology and "intergovernmentalist" governments supporting restrictive procedures. Rather, member governments tailor their comitology preferences according 146 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / February-March 2003 8. EP document A3-310/90. to the specific issue area or even the specific piece of legislation to hand as a function of their substantive interests in a given issue area and their estimation of the Commission's likely behavior in that area.
9 As one member-state official pointed out, "It isn't easy to discern a predictable pattern across the whole spectrum. By subject, however, there is rather more predictability." For example, Germany, Denmark, and Spain tend to prefer "heavier" comitology in the area of the environment, in which they represent the "leader" and "laggard" countries, respectively; Germany and Spain are most sensitive to comitology when it comes to spending programs, in which they respectively represent the largest net contributor to and largest net recipient of EU funding. 10 Similarly, individual member governments may exhibit very different institutional preferences across issue areas, supporting less restrictive comitology for areas of market liberalization such as merger control while demanding more restrictive measures in areas of market regulation or vice versa.
More generally, when asked whether the choice of comitology procedures matters in the determination of policy outcomes or simply reflects interinstitutional posturing among the Commission, EP, and Council, one member-state official replied, Comitology is certainly seen to matter. Much depends on the individuals and the culture of a particular committee, but the Commission can treat advisory and management committees pretty cavalierly, so-if you think that a particular delegated responsibility is politically important-it is not unreasonable to look for a procedure which maximizes your influence. With a regulatory committee, there is more pressure on the Commission to work for a consensus or near-consensus solution in the Committee to avoid the delay and hassle of a reference to Council. There are still knee-jerk institutional reactions from all sides. . . . But most member states' assessments are based on a fairly hardheaded view of where their national interests lie, which is in turn based on a view of how sympathetic the Commission is likely to be to them. (personal communication, member state official, November 12, 2001) Although hardly conclusive, such views, supported by the case study presented in the next section, suggest both that the choice of comitology rules is perceived by member-state officials to influence policy outcomes in the EU and that member governments do not consistently accept legitimate templates in the choice of comitology committees but tailor those choices according to their issue-specific preferences, as predicted by rational-choice theories of institutional design.
response to this demand, Internal Market Commissioner Fritz's Bolkestein indicated that such a commitment had already been made by the Commission as part of the 1999 Comitology Decision-but he also noted pointedly that "the size of a predominant view has never been laid down, not in 1999 by the Commission nor now," and continued to note that, "obviously, it is something less than a qualified majority vote. In other words, it is between 50% and the qualified majority" (as cited in AFX European Focus, 2001 ). This deliberate ambiguity is preserved in the final text prepared for Stockholm, which reads, as follows:
The European Council notes that within the framework of the Comitology Decision of June 28, 1999, the Commission has committed itself to find a balanced solution for those cases of implementing measures in the field of securities markets acknowledged in the light of discussions to be particularly sensitive, to avoid going against predominant views which might emerge in the Council, as to the appropriateness of such measures. This commitment shall not constitute a precedent. (Stockholm European Council, 2001, Annex I) Following that agreement, the European Council approved the Lamfalussy Report at Stockholm, and the Commission formally established the Committee in June 2001. The question of parliamentary involvement, finally, was resolved in February 2002 on the basis of a compromise between the EP and the Commission, in which the EP renounced its demand for a call-back mechanism in return for a statement from President Prodi assuring the EP that the Securities Committee would operate with "full transparency vis-à-vis EP," which would receive a period of 3 months to consider draft-implementing measures before adoption. In addition, the Commission agreed to accept the inclusion by EP of "sunset clauses" in framework legislation limiting the delegation of implementing powers to a 4-year period, after which Parliamentary approval would be required for renewal.
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The ultimate significance of these interinstitutional compromises for policy will emerge only in the coming years when the Commission begins to adopt implementing regulations under the supervision of the Securities Committee. Nevertheless, the case of securities regulation supports the view that member governments self-consciously delegate powers to the Commission so as to benefit from both the speed and the flexibility of executive decision making, which, by contrast with the painful slowness of the normal EU legislative process, was seen as vital to adopt the Commission's Action Plan before 2005 and adapt it to changing market conditions. However, the interinstitutional and intergovernmental negotiations leading up to the establishment of the Securities Committee also suggest that both the EP and member governments remain acutely aware of the problems of control. Indeed, in terms of the rationalist/constructivist debate outlined above, the most striking aspect of the case is that, although all sides had recently adopted a simplified regulatory committee procedure in the 1999 decision, they did not fall back on that procedure as a legitimate template but instead sought to negotiate ad hoc institutional rules designed to maximize their own control.
CONCLUSION
In terms of the categories laid down by Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel in their introduction to this volume, this chapter featured a "zero-order test" of competing middle-range hypotheses from rational choice institutionalism and sociological institutionalism about the determinants of actors' preferences and choices in the creation of comitology committees. As we have seen, the available quantitative, qualitative, and case-study evidence supports the rationalist hypothesis that EU member governments, as well as the Commission and the EP, are aware of the implications of different committee procedures for member-state control and Commission autonomy, and all three sets of actors display procedural preferences consistent with the predictions of the principal-agent approach. As we have seen, the Commission has consistently preferred less restrictive comitology procedures, although in practice it has demonstrated a willingness to compromise on a case-by-case basis to secure the adoption of valued legislation in the Council. As for the EP, both the statistical data collected by Dogan (2000) and the qualitative analysis presented above support the view that the EP consistently seeks to maximize its own role in the comitology process-a campaign it has pursued using every legal, financial, and political means at its disposal. Within the Council, finally, member governments carefully calculate the likely consequences of different comitology procedures, advocating and bargaining for the committee procedures most likely to produce their preferred policy outcomes, even when the resulting choices clash with clear and legitimate institutional templates. Hence, in a competitive test of rationalist and sociological hypotheses about the choice of comitology committees, the available evidence supports rationalist predictions while infirming sociological institutionalist predictions about comitology choices being guided by broad institutional templates and/or a logic of appropriateness.
The findings presented above do not demonstrate that deliberation does not take place in comitology committees or that those committees are used 152 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / February-March 2003 exclusively by member governments with fixed preferences as a means of constraining the Commission. Deliberation, argumentation, persuasion and collective preference formation may take place in at least some comitology committees, as Neyer (1997a, 1997b) argued. Indeed, it may be, as many constructivists argue, that institutions established for one purpose (namely, control of the Commission) take on a very different purpose (namely, supranational deliberation) in day-to-day practice. At the extreme, one might argue that the proper relationship of rationalist and constructivist views of comitology is not one of competitive testing but rather a "domain of application" or a "sequencing" approach, in which actors behave in accordance with a logic of consequences and strategic bargaining in the choice of comitology committees, although shifting to a deliberative problem-solving mode in the day-to-day workings of those committees.
Nevertheless, both the domain of application and the sequencing approaches are difficult to reconcile with the theories and the empirical findings summarized in this article. In theoretical terms, it is unclear why rational actors would expend considerable time and energy to secure specific comitology rules as instruments of control if we posit at the same time that those rules are regularly put aside in favor of supranational deliberation in committees. In empirical terms, moreover, we have seen that the key institutional actors representing the Commission, EP, and member governments, many of whom have extensive experience within comitology committees as well, express the view both publicly and privately that comitology rules matter for determining political outcomes and bargain over comitology rules as if they matter. Positing discrete domains of application or sequencing in which rationalists explain institutional choice and constructivists explain the workings of those institutions, therefore, does not generate a fuller or more convincing account of comitology, as Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel suggest it should; rather, it poses the additional puzzle of why experienced Brussels operators would so fundamentally misunderstand the nature of the comitology process and create and recreate committees that do not serve their ostensible control function. Once again, this does not mean that deliberation never occurs in comitology meetings, but it does suggest that controlling the Commission through the application of legal rules is, and remains, a core function of comitology committees in practice and that the domain of application of constructivist accounts of deliberative supranationalism constitutes at best a subset of the universe of all such committees. Defining that domain of application, and specifying the scope conditions for such deliberation, represent the difficult empirical work still ahead in the study of EU committees.
